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WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 7

Dep't of Natural Res. v. Silverstone & Drakes Canal Inc., 674 N.W.2d
266 (Neb. 2004) (holding that the notice of hearing to cancel water
appropriations for nonuse was adequate, and that the evidence was
sufficient to support the findings of the Department of Natural
Resources).
The Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") entered an order
on May 20, 2003, partially canceling the water rights on land owned by
Silverstone and Dakes Canal Inc., Vance Dake, and Marcia Uehling
("Silverstone"). Silverstone appealed DNR's order to the Supreme
Court of Nebraska, which affirmed DNR's order.
Water appropriation number A-5000 ("appropriation") was a water
right to divert 0.57 cubic feet per second ("cfs") of water from the
Sappa Creek at certain points for irrigation of 62.6 acres of land in
Harlan County, Nebraska. Silverstone was the owner of the land
covered by the appropriation, which had a priority date of July 30,
1952. On January 31, 2003, the DNR sent a notice to Silverstone
stating that a hearing would take place to determine whether to cancel
all or part of appropriation as a result of nonuse for more than three
consecutive years.
DNR held the hearing on March 18, 2003. At the hearing, DNR
presented a verified field investigation report regarding the irrigation
of the land covered by the appropriation. Based on the report and the
testimony of witnesses, DNR concluded that part of the land
designated under the appropriation was not subject to irrigation for
more than three consecutive years, thus cancellation of that part of the
DNR issued an order of
appropriation was therefore proper.
cancellation in part on May 20, 2003.
Silverstone appealed DNR's order partially canceling the water
rights of Silverstone and other landowners. In doing so, Silverstone
made a few key arguments. The court first addressed Silverstone's
arguments regarding the adequacy of the notice. Silverstone argued
that the notice did not properly state the issues involved and that the
notice failed to indicate properly the important phone numbers. The
court held that the notice adequately informed Silverstone of the
issues because it clearly stated the purpose of the hearing and the fact
that interested persons should appear. The court also noted that the
notice contained copies of relevant statutes. The court also rejected
Silverstone's argument regarding the notice's statement of phone
numbers, finding that the provision of the phone number was
sufficient under the state statute.
The court then proceeded to Silverstone's arguments regarding
DNR's findings. On this issue, Silverstone asserted that DNR erred in
finding that irrigation did not occur on the canceled portion of the
land for more than three consecutive years and, in the alternative,
argued that DNR erred in not finding sufficient cause for nonuse. At
the onset of its discussion of these issues, the court noted the limits on
court's ability to review the director's factual determinations.
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Specifically, the court stated it could only decide whether competent
and relevant evidence supported such determinations, and whether
the determinations were arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. In this
case, the court held that both determinations were supported by
or
sufficient evidence and were not arbitrary, capricious,
unreasonable. Consequently, the court rejected both arguments.
In conclusion, the court rejected all of Silverstone's arguments and
affirmed DNR's order.
Benjamin M. Petre

NEW JERSEY
In re Adopted Amendments to N.J. Admin. Code tit. 7, § 7A-2.4, 365
N.J. Super. 255 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (holding that New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's adoption of the
Landscape Project method to classify wetlands was neither inconsistent
with governing statue, unsupported by the record, nor arbitrary or
capricious).
New Jersey Builders Association ("Builders") challenged as ultra
vires the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's
("DEP") adoption of the Landscape Project method ("LPM") to
classify wetlands. In 2002, DEP adopted the LPM to classify wetlands
supporting the habitats of threatened or endangered species as
wetlands of exceptional resource value. Prior to the adoption of LPM,
DEP made wetlands determinations entirely on specific sightings of
Based on the
individual threatened or endangered species.
assumption that species are located in the middle of their home range,
DEP mapped a habitat for that species regardless of whether the entire
mapped area contained features that the species actually used or
required. LPM broadened the field of inquiry beyond "sightingspecific" areas. Using satellite imagery, LPM focuses on habitat areas
required to support local populations of threatened or endangered
wildlife species. By adopting LPM, DEP sought to establish a more
population driven parameter of habitat protection that would best
ensure the continued, long-term existence of a particular documented
species or population in an identified wetland. Builders appealed
DEP's decision to adopt the LPM in Superior Court of New Jersey,
Appellate Division claiming LPM exceeded DEP's statutory mandate.
The court stated that judicial review of state agency regulations is
restricted to three inquiries: (1) whether the agency's action violated
the enabling act's express or implied legislative policies, (2) whether
there was substantial evidence in the record to support the findings on
which the agency based their action, and (3) whether in applying the
legislative policies to the facts the agency clearly erred by reaching a
conclusion that could not reasonably have been made upon a showing

